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Abstract
Background: There is a general consensus that another influenza pandemic is inevitable. Although health care
workers (HCWs) are essential to the health system response, there are few studies exploring HCW attitudes to
pandemic influenza. The aim of this study was to explore HCWs knowledge, attitudes and intended behaviour
towards pandemic influenza.
Methods: Cross-sectional investigation of a convenience sample of clinical and non-clinical HCWs from two
tertiary-referral teaching hospitals in Sydney, Australia was conducted between June 4 and October 19, 2007. The
self-administered questionnaire was distributed to hospital personal from 40 different wards and departments.
The main outcome measures were intentions regarding work attendance and quarantine, antiviral use and
perceived preparation.
Results: Respondents were categorized into four main groups by occupation: Nursing (47.5%), Medical (26.0%),
Allied (15.3%) and Ancillary (11.2%). Our study found that most HCWs perceived pandemic influenza to be very
serious (80.9%, n = 873) but less than half were able to correctly define it (43.9%, n = 473). Only 24.8% of
respondents believed their department to be prepared for a pandemic, but nonetheless most were willing to work
during a pandemic if a patient or colleague had influenza. The main determinants of variation in our study were
occupational factors, demographics and health beliefs. Non-clinical staff were significantly most likely to be unsure
of their intentions (OR 1.43, p < 0.001). Only 42.5% (n = 459) of respondents considered that neuraminidase
inhibitor antiviral medications (oseltamivir/zanamivir) would protect them against pandemic influenza, whereas
77.5% (n = 836) believed that vaccination would be of benefit.
Conclusion: We identified two issues that could undermine the best of pandemic plans – the first, a low level of
confidence in antivirals as an effective measure; secondly, that non-clinical workers are an overlooked group
whose lack of knowledge and awareness could undermine pandemic plans. Other issues included a high level of
confidence in dietary measures to protect against influenza, and a belief among ancillary workers that antibiotics
would be protective. All health care worker strategies should include non clinical and ancillary staff to ensure
adequate business continuity for hospitals. HCW education, psychosocial support and staff communication could
improve knowledge of appropriate pandemic interventions and confidence in antivirals.
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Background
Since the start of the decade, endemicity and expanding
outbreaks of avian influenza A/H5N1 have highlighted
the threat of a future global influenza pandemic [1,2].
During the last year, transmission of avian influenza to
humans has been reported in several countries. Up until
now there has been little evidence that avian influenza is
able to spread among humans, but if this were to happen,
a pandemic may develop. Experts at WHO believe that
"the world is now closer to another influenza pandemic
than at any time since 1968" [3].
Estimates of the impact of a potential influenza pandemic
range from 2 to 7.4 million deaths globally. In high
income countries alone, models project a demand for
134–233 million outpatient visits and 1.5–5.2 million
hospital admissions. Recent estimates from the UK sug-
gest that up to half of the UK population could become
infected (30 million people), with between 50,000 and
750,000 additional deaths as a result [4].
During a pandemic, health care workers (HCWs) will be
essential to the health system response. Pandemic plans
often specify that, in addition to patient care, HCWs will
be involved in public health education, epidemiological
surveillance, quarantine management, fever clinics, stag-
ing facility operation, and more [5,6]. Complicating this,
however, are the various conflicting ethical and psychoso-
cial issues relating to HCWs during an influenza pan-
demic: allocation and rationing of limited health
resources, HCWs' professional versus family responsibili-
ties, staff absenteeism and workforce issues, the risk to
HCWs' personal safety, restrictions of personal liberties
during quarantine, amongst others [7]. Therefore, an
understanding of HCW knowledge, attitudes and behav-
iour is crucial in planning for an influenza pandemic.
Addressing these issues is particularly important, as it has
been argued that the threat of pandemic influenza may
lead to aimless or unreasonable actions by health care
workers [8]. Therefore the purpose of this study was to
extend previous research by assessing the knowledge and
intended behaviour during an influenza pandemic
amongst clinical and non-clinical hospital staff.
Methods
Between June 4 and October 19, 2007, we conducted a
cross-sectional survey in two tertiary-referral teaching hos-
pitals (one adult and one paediatric) to determine HCW's
knowledge of pandemic influenza and behavioural inten-
tions during that period.
Survey
We developed an anonymous 2 page survey that assessed
the following characteristics of participants: (1) Demo-
graphic characteristics, family situation, specialty; (2)
Pandemic influenza knowledge and perceptions; (3)
Intended behaviour in the event of a pandemic; (4)
Intended compliance with public health measures; (5)
Perception of pandemic influenza preparedness; and (6)
Knowledge of infection control measures. Tick boxes were
provided for responses to questions which were all closed.
The original version of the questionnaire was pilot tested,
with five health care workers who were similar in their
characteristics to the members of the study population, in
order to ensure practicability, validity, and interpretation
of answers. The questionnaire was revised before the dis-
tribution to the study sample, on the basis of the sugges-
tions and comments obtained from the pilot study.
Instrument revision included changes to questionnaire
item wording and format only if there was near universal
consensus on their meaning. The survey is available from
the lead author upon request.
Participants and Sampling
We contacted the head of each of the 40 wards or depart-
ments by either e-mail or letter to obtain permission to
attend appropriate meetings to distribute surveys. These
wards/departments were randomly selected from a list of
all wards/departments in each of the hospitals. There were
27 wards from the Children's Hospital and 13 from the
adult's hospital. A convenience sample of 1200 (15%)
staff members was randomly selected to be surveyed from
the 8000 staff members who work in the two hospitals.
Only 894 staff members returned the survey.
Participants returned the survey to us immediately or by
interoffice mail. We also met with Nurse Unit Managers
from participating wards/departments, who agreed to dis-
tribute the survey amongst nurses and other staff. The sur-
veys were returned in a central envelope in a secure
location. The questionnaire was also available on the
intranet, which was available to staff in the paediatric hos-
pital only. Access to the electronic questionnaire
depended on the hospital staff (from all four categories)
having access to the hospital computer system.
Four groups were surveyed: Medical (Staff specialists, reg-
istrars, medical students etc), Nursing (registered nurses,
nurse unit managers, and enrolled nurses etc), Allied
Health Personnel (physiotherapists, occupational thera-
pists, psychologists etc) and Ancillary staff (domestic serv-
ices, administration, computer specialists etc). The latter
group also included any staff member who was deemed to
not have direct patient contact including academic staff
and other public health professional staff.
To keep track of the departments who responded and to
identify those who required follow-up, each ward/depart-
ment was individually coded with an identificationBMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:30 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/30
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number, known only to the research investigators. To
encourage participation amongst those wards/depart-
ments who failed to return the questionnaires, and in
order to increase the response rate, emails were sent to the
head of the department to ask them to encourage staff par-
ticipation.
Data analysis, Funding Support and Ethical Approval
The χ2 or Fisher exact test was used to assess the statistical
significance of categorical variables. We considered results
to be statistically significant with p < 0.05 via the Fisher's
exact test. All analyses were performed using the OpenEpi
2.2 statistical package [9]. The survey was supported by
the National Centre for Immunization Research and Sur-
veillance, Children's Hospital at Westmead. Ethical
approval was sought and granted from both of the hospi-
tals.
Results
A total of 1200 surveys were distributed (paper surveys)
and 894 collected in the period of June 4 and October 19,
2007 (response rate: 74.5%). A further 185 question-
naires were submitted electronically from staff at the pae-
diatric hospital, resulting in a total of 1079 completed
questionnaires. We received 559 surveys (52%) from the
paediatric and 520 surveys (48%) from the adult hospital.
Respondents were categorized into four main groups by
occupation: Nursing (47.5%), Medical (26.0%), Allied
(15.3%) and Ancillary (11.2%). In the paediatric hospital,
28% (559/2000) of the staff members completed the sur-
vey. In the adult's hospital, 8.6% (520/6000) of the staff
members completed the survey. Participant's occupa-
tional and demographic characteristics are summarized in
Table 1.
Of 1079 respondents, 43.8% (n = 473) were able to cor-
rectly identify the meaning of "pandemic influenza",
whilst 54.4% (n = 559) incorrectly labelled a pandemic as
being either "a large outbreak of influenza in a given
country or geographic area or yearly cases of influenza"
(Table 2). 63.0% of ancillary staff was unable to correctly
identify what a pandemic was. Medical staff was signifi-
cantly more likely to select the correct definition than
nurses. The majority of those surveyed considered that an
influenza pandemic would be "very serious" if one were
to occur. Groups significantly more likely to consider an
influenza pandemic to be "very serious" were: front-line
clinical staff (medical and nursing) (82.8%; OR 1.52, p <
.01) and respondents who correctly defined pandemic
influenza (88.1%; OR 2.45, p < .001).
When asked whether they consider their ward/depart-
ment to be sufficiently prepared for an influenza pan-
demic, only 24.8% (n = 268) responded in the
affirmative. Medical and nursing staff (19.9%; OR 0.4071,
p < .001) and those who considered pandemic influenza
to be very serious (23.4%; OR 0.6629, p < .01) were sig-
nificantly less likely to consider their ward/department
prepared, whilst ancillary and support staff were signifi-
cantly more likely to consider their ward/department to
be sufficiently prepared (49.5%; OR 3.54, p < .001).
In the event of an influenza pandemic, 83.3% (n = 899)
of respondents indicated that they would present to work
if a patient in their ward/department had an influenza-
like illness, whilst 79.0% (n = 852) would present to work
if a colleague had contracted pandemic influenza and
60.6% (n = 654) if a family member had an influenza-like
illness. Most would not present to work if they themselves
had symptoms consistent with influenza (81.2%, n =
876), including in the context of a severe staff shortage
(53.4%, n = 576). Of the medical staff, 23.5% stated that
they would attend work if they had symptoms during a
severe staff shortage, however 48.0% would stay home if
a family member was unwell. For nursing and allied
health staff, 15.0% and 26.4% stated respectively that they
would turn up to work if they had symptoms during a
work shortage and 35% of respondents from both catego-
r i e s  w o u l d  n o t  a t t e n d  w o r k  i f  a  f a m i l y  m e m b e r  w a s
unwell. Non-clinical staff (ancillary/support) were signif-
icantly more likely to be unsure of their intentions (OR
1.43, p < .001). Factors significantly associated with work
avoidance were: HCW category (nursing) and not cor-
rectly knowing what a pandemic was. Whereas, factors sig-
nificantly associated with inappropriate work behaviour
(such as turning up to work with an ILI) during a potential
pandemic included age, HCW category (non-clinical),
and perceived seriousness of pandemic influenza (Table
3).
When asked whether they would comply with quarantine
measures, in the event of an influenza pandemic, 45.0%
(n = 486) of respondents intended to comply, a further
28.4% (n = 307) would comply but would be "very
unhappy" about cooperating with the measures. Factors
significantly affecting quarantine compliance and attitude
(p < .05) were age <40 years, perceived seriousness of pan-
demic influenza and incorrect knowledge of pandemic
influenza. Factors associated with participants feeling
"unhappy" about quarantine included having children
and being aged ≤40 years.
Staff indicated a high level of intended treatment adher-
ence to any antiviral medications which may be provided
to them in the event of an influenza pandemic, with
81.3% (n = 877) indicating an intention to take the course
as instructed and only 6.8% (n = 73) indicating that they
would divert the medications to family members. Factors
affecting antiviral adherence and possible diversion to
family members were: HCW category (ancillary/support),BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:30 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/30
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sex and age group. Those who were unhappy with quaran-
tine were also significantly more likely to divert antivirals
to their family (Table 4).
Only 42.5% (n = 459) of respondents considered that
neuraminidase inhibitor antiviral medications (oseltami-
vir/zanamivir) would protect them against pandemic
influenza, whereas 77.5% (n = 836) believed that vaccina-
tion would be of benefit. Medical staff (60.1%; OR 2.642,
p < .001) were significantly more likely to consider neu-
raminidase inhibitors effective than any of the other
groups surveyed, whereas ancillary staff were significantly
more likely to believe that antibiotics would be effective
for personal protection (18.2%; OR 1.954; p < .01). Nurs-
ing staff were significantly more likely to believe that eat-
ing well would be protective (65.8%; OR 2.338, p < .001).
When asked what other interventions they considered
would protect them from pandemic influenza, partici-
pants rated hand washing first (90.7%), followed by wear-
ing gloves (69.6%), wearing a mask (81.8%), pandemic
influenza vaccination (77.5%), and eating well (55.3%).
Discussion
In the aftermath of SARS, many issues surrounding health
care worker behaviour and professionalism have been dis-
cussed [10-14], however to the best of our knowledge,
Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of Participating Healthcare Workers (HCWs)





Occupational cohort (three largest categories)
Nursing* 512 (47.5)
Registered Nurse 318
Clinical Nurse Supervisor 67
















Not specified 27 (2.50)
Home/living arrangements
Live alone 108 (10.0)
Live in shared accommodation 267 (24.7)
Live with partner/spouse 132 (12.2)
Live with partner/spouse and children 446 (41.3)
Other 98 (9.10)






Not specified 28 (2.6)
* Nursing staff categories (Nurse Unit Manager, Clinical Nurse Co-ordinator, Clinical Nurse Supervisor, Registered Nurse, Enrolled Nurse, Student 
Nurse, Nurse Educator); Medical staff categories (Staff Specialist, Visiting Medical Officer, Registrar, Resident, Intern, Research Fellow, Medical 
Student); Allied Health staff category (Occupational Therapist, Physiotherapist, Dietician, Speech Therapist, Psychologist, Social Worker, Blood 
Collection, Laboratory Technician); Ancillary staff categories (Domestic services, IT, Administration, Security, Maintenance, Chaplain, Intake 
Officer, Finance).BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:30 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/30
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only a few studies have addressed these issues in relation
to the anticipated influenza pandemic [15]. Our results
suggest that most HCWs (83.3%) working in the two hos-
pitals surveyed saw it as their professional obligation to
treat sick patients and would continue working despite
the potential risks. These results are in corroboration with
previous studies from Hong Kong (84%) [16]. However,
they differ from other research in Australia (67%) [17],
and from the United States (50%) [18]. The differences
may relate to non standard survey questions or a factor of
time, with knowledge and intentions changing as expo-
sure to information about PI increases. Suggested reasons
for this include the fact that HCWs consider it unethical to
abandon their professional responsibilities in order to
protect themselves or their families [14,19].
When participants were asked whether they consider their
ward/department to be sufficiently prepared for an influ-













What is pandemic influenza?
Yearly cases of the 'Flu' 2 (0.70) 12 (2.30) 3 (1.80) 11 (9.10) 28 (2.60)
A large outbreak in a given country/area 97 (34.5) 297 (58.0) 102 (62.6) 63 (52.1) 559 (51.8)
Influenza affecting birds 2 (0.70) 1 (0.20) 0 0 3 (0.30)
A disease which affects people in Asia 0 0 1 (0.60) 0 1 (0.10)
Global outbreak of a new influenza virus 180 (64.1) 192 (37.5) 54 (35.0) 44 (36.4) 473 (43.8)
Unsure 0 10 (2.00) 0 3 (2.50) 15 (1.40)
How serious would a pandemic be if it occurred?
Not serious 0 2 (0.40) 0 0 2 (0.19)
Somewhat 33(11.7) 67 (13.1) 35 (21.5) 21 (17.4) 156 (14.5)
Very serious 244 (86.8) 413 (80.7) 125 (76.7) 91 (75.2) 873 (80.9)
Unsure 3 (1.10) 16 (3.10) 3 (1.80) 5 (4.10) 29 (2.69)
Not specified 1 (0.40) 14 (2.70) 0 4 (3.30) 19 (1.76)
Is your ward/department prepared?
Yes 44 (15.7) 114 (22.3) 50 (30.7) 60 (49.6) 268 (24.8)
No 218 (77.6) 353 (68.9) 103 (63.2) 54 (44.6) 728 (67.5)
Not specified 19 (6.80) 45 (8.80) 10 (6.10) 7 (5.80) 83 (7.70)
Table 3: Results from univariate analysis of work practice in different scenarios
Scenario No. OR Lower Upper P value
Work avoidance
Patient on ward has pandemic influenza
Female 45 1.45 0.69 3.13 NS
Have children 19 0.68 0.37 1.24 NS
Pandemic influenza "very serious" 43 0.77 0.39 1.53 NS
Medical/nursing 36 0.59 0.32 1.09 NS
Colleague died of pandemic influenza
Female 57 1.11 0.60 2.06 NS
Have children 31 1.31 0.79 2.18 NS
Medical/nursing 46 0.50 0.30 0.83 <0.05
Incorrect knowledge 50 0.57 0.34 0.95 <0.05
Inappropriate work practice
Staff shortage/participant unwell
Age <40 years 158 2.66 1.85 3.83 <0.05
Incorrect knowledge 135 1.51 1.08 2.11 <0.05
Pandemic influenza "very serious" 164 0.58 0.39 0.86 <0.05
Pandemic influenza "somewhat serious" 45 1.75 1.14 2.69 <0.05
Medical/nursing 143 0.66 0.47 0.94 NS
Ancillary/support staff 31 1.52 0.92 2.48 <0.05BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:30 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/30
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enza pandemic, only 24.8% responded in the affirmative.
This high lack of confidence in the department's prepara-
tion may actually stem from a real lack of preparation by
the hospital or department, or may just be a result of
HCWs being unaware of any planning which has been
conducted. Further studies would need to be conducted to
ascertain which of these two options the most likely rea-
son is.
While many health care workers will willingly attend
work during an infectious diseases emergency, history
provides many stories of physicians who have avoided
responsibility for treating patients [20]. The appearance of
an exotic, highly virulent disease, challenges HCWs to
question their interpretation of the duty of care, in partic-
ular, its limits. This challenge was apparent both in the
HIV/AIDS epidemics of the 1980s, where fear about con-
tact with infected patients among some clinicians chal-
lenged their responsibilities to these patients and
secondly in the 2003 SARs outbreaks [21-24]. There were
several reports during the SARs outbreak that HCWs in
Hong Kong and Toronto either avoided the physical
examination of sick patients or refused to work altogether
on the grounds that they presented too great a risk. In
China, at the height of the SARs epidemic, at least one
hospital had difficulty maintaining services due to absen-
teeism some of which was driven by fear of getting sick
[25]. A recent survey assessing the willingness and ability
of HCWs to report to duty during catastrophic disaster in
New York City, found that although more than 80% were
willing and/or able to report to work for mass casualty or
environmental disaster, only 57% to 68% would be will-
ing to report to work during a severe acute respiratory syn-
drome (SARS) or smallpox outbreak [12].
Fears for personal safety and family responsibilities are
commonly the main issues underlying possibly absentee-
ism during a pandemic – in our study the rate of absentee-
ism doubled in the scenario of a family member being
infected. Our finding was also echoed in the New York
survey, where fears and concern for the family and for
themselves were the most frequently stated reasons for
not being willing to report to work [12]. Whilst in a sec-
ond study, the authors reported that almost one third of
the HCWs they surveyed either strongly agreed or agreed
that it was professionally acceptable for HCWs to aban-
don their workplace during a pandemic in order to protect
themselves and their families [19].
It is interesting to note that willingness to work varied
considerably according to the individual's knowledge and
their job classification. Medical and nursing staff was sig-
nificantly more likely to report to work, whereas ancillary
staff was unsure of their intentions during this period. A
recent study by Ehrenstein et al, reported a similar finding
in that the rate of administrators not willing to accept per-
sonal risk was approximately twice as high as the rate of
other staff [18]. This difference may correlate with a per-
ception of the importance of one's role in the hospital
during the response. Whilst it's important to encourage all
categories of staff members to turn up for work – it must
be done in an appropriate manner. Inappropriate working
Table 4: Factors affecting compliance with public health measures during an influenza pandemic
Scenario No. OR Lower Upper P value
Will comply with quarantine measures
Age group <40 years 438 0.72 0.54 0.97 <0.05
Female 581 0.74 0.52 1.06 NS
Pandemic influenza "very serious" 655 1.58 1.13 2.22 <0.05
Pandemic influenza "somewhat serious" 101 0.62 0.43 0.91 <0.05
Incorrect knowledge 407 0.63 0.47 0.84 <0.05
Incorrect knowledge (only "large outbreak") 387 0.65 0.49 0.87 <0.05
Very unhappy about quarantine
Have children 116 0.72 0.54 0.98 <0.05
Age group <40 years 190 1.54 1.13 2.09 <0.05
Incorrect knowledge 172 1.33 0.99 1.80 <0.05
Inappropriate work practice 62 1.48 0.99 2.21 <0.05
Will take antivirals as directed
Medical/nursing 638 1.28 0.90 1.81 NS
Will comply with quarantine measures 665 1.93 1.38 2.70 <0.05
Will give antivirals to family (all/some)
Female 45 0.49 0.29 0.84 <0.05
Have children 41 1.81 1.09 3.00 <0.05
Medical/nursing 40 0.46 0.27 0.77 <0.05
Ancillary/support staff 14 2.06 1.06 3.98 <0.05
Very unhappy about quarantine 25 1.76 0.95 3.26 <0.05BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:30 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/30
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behaviours were identified when participants were asked
to nominate their potential response in a given situation.
For example, when asked whether they would attend work
during a staff shortage, if they had symptoms consistent
with pandemic influenza, 24% of medical staff and 26%
of ancillary staff said yes. In a second scenario, partici-
pants were asked whether they would attend work if a
close family member was diagnosed. This time over half
of the participants stated that they would. Whilst this may
not be detrimental in light of antiviral and vaccine availa-
bility, in the early stages of a pandemic, this behaviour
may be linked to the spread of the disease.
Quarantine is a key public health measure in pandemic
influenza plans. It is also one of the oldest methods of
controlling communicable disease outbreaks. Australia's
pandemic influenza plans, amongst others, emphasize
the use of quarantine measures (home quarantine for up
to one week) in combination with social distancing meas-
ures and antiviral medications. Our study defined quaran-
tine as involving: (i) being forbidden to use public
transport, (ii) being allowed only to travel directly from
home to work and back, (iii) being isolated from other
family members in their home (as was enforced in Can-
ada during the 2003 SARS outbreak) [26]. We found that
most HCWs would comply with such quarantine meas-
ures (and adhere to antiviral medications), however, a
large proportion of those surveyed stated that they would
be very unhappy about it, which could ultimately affect
compliance with the measures. Helping people to under-
stand the reason for various protocols might increase their
belief in their effectiveness and thus, their compliance.
The use of education was previously examined in a post
SARS article which examined a cohort of persons quaran-
tined during the 2003 SARS outbreak in Canada [26]. The
authors found that compliance could have been improved
by providing enhanced education and support. The
authors also felt that this could have also reduced the psy-
chological distress in the quarantined adults.
In a study by Shiao et al, factors related to nurse's consid-
eration of leaving their jobs during the SARS outbreak in
Taiwan were examined [26]. The authors found that the
main predictors were short tenure, increased work stress,
perceived risk of fatality from SARS, and affected social
relationships. On the contrary, belief in the effectiveness
of personal protective equipment (PPE) was not an
important predictive factor for nurse's consideration of
leaving their job. This was because most nurses surveyed
believed that protective measures at work were generally
effective. While we cannot ascertain from our study
whether there is a link between PPE effectiveness and
work attendance, we can make postulations about the
confidence the staff have in the different protective meas-
ures. For example, when respondents were asked what
will protect you from getting pandemic influenza, the
most common response was washing hands, wearing
masks and vaccination. However, when it came to antivi-
ral use, more respondents stated that "eating well" would
offer better personal protection then the anti-viral drugs
oseltamivir ("Tamiflu") or zanamvir ("Relenza") against
pandemic influenza.
There are a number of limitations to this study that need
to be discussed. It is important to recognize that the gen-
eralisability of our results may have been affected by the
limitations inherent to any voluntary questionnaire-based
cross sectional study. Given the design of the study, we
relied on a convenience sample of 1200 staff members
from the total number (8000) of hospital staff in both
hospitals. From this number, only 894 actually returned
the survey. As responses were voluntary, there may have
been responder bias in the sample. We were unable to
compare the demographics of the respondents versus
non-respondents to examine how representative the sam-
ple actually was. This information was not available to the
study authors. We can only rely on the fact that we
obtained a 13.5% sample from the two hospitals. This
sample is considerable large for such a study. Another lim-
itation relates to the online response rate. The online invi-
tation to complete the survey electronically was seen by an
unknown number of staff at the paediatric hospital lead-
ing to a lack of denominator data about the 185 complet-
ing it. Nevertheless, the paper-based survey was
comprehensive, yielding a large sample and acceptable
response rate.
There may also be limitations with generalisability since
we included only two hospitals in a single Australian city.
It is also unknown as to whether responses given to the
hypothetical situations posed in a questionnaire accu-
rately reflect real-world responses of the respondents in
the event of an actual influenza pandemic.
Despite these issues, the large sample size of our study,
broad spectrum of HCWs represented, and representative
age/gender demographics provide a general indication of
what responses to a pandemic may occur and provide
information on differences between health care worker
groups. In addition, much research focusing on behav-
ioural intentions indicates the potential for these to be
reasonable in predicting actual behaviour [27].
Conclusion
It is apparent from our findings that there are several
issues that must be addressed as part of health system pre-
paredness for a coming influenza pandemic: HCWs
should be provided with appropriate targeted education
and within this ancillary staff need to be included, the psy-
chosocial needs and concerns of HCWs should bePublish with BioMed Central    and   every 
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addressed in pandemic planning, communication regard-
ing health resources/planning should be improved to
develop staff confidence, and consideration could be
given to families of HCWs also receiving priority access to
the National Medical Stockpile. In the face of a pandemic
influenza threat, health department employee's unwill-
ingness to report to duty may pose a threat to the nation's
emergency response infrastructure. This must include all
classifications of staff which are fundamental to the hos-
pital's operation. We feel that addressing these issues of
importance to HCWs is essential to ensure an effective and
appropriate health system response.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Authors' contributions
HS participated in the design of the study and survey,
undertook the distribution and collection, performed the
analysis and drafted the manuscript. JL participated in the
design of the study and survey and reviewed the manu-
script. KP helped perform the statistical analysis and
drafted the manuscript. CRM participated in its design
and coordination and helped to draft the manuscript. All
authors read and approved the final manuscript.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the CEO of both hospitals for allowing us to under-
take the survey, as well as the staff from every department and wards who 
participated. Thanks also go to Pamela Cheung, Myra Parsons and Kylee 
Gibbins for their help on the date collection.
References
1. Fauci AS: Pandemic influenza threat and preparedness.  Emerg
Infect Dis 2006, 12(1):73-77.
2. Webby RJ, Webster RG: Are we ready for pandemic influenza?
Science 2003, 302(5650):1519-1522.
3. Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response (EPR): Pan-
demic preparedness   [http://www.wpro.who.int/health_topics/
pandemic_preparedness/]
4. Pandemic Flu: A national framework for responding to an
influenza pandemic   [http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publichealth/Flu/
PandemicFlu/index.htm]
5. NSW Health: NSW Health interim influenza pandemic action
plan.  Sydney 2005.
6. Office of Health Protection, Commonwealth of Australia: Austral-
ian health management plan for pandemic influenza.  Depart-
ment of Health and Ageing. Canberra; 2006. 
7. Sokol DK: Virulent epidemics and scope of healthcare work-
ers' duty of care.  Emerg Infect Dis 2006, 12(8):1238-1241.
8. Bonneux L, Van Damme W: An iatrogenic pandemic of panic.
BMJ 2006, 332(7544):786-788.
9. CDC: Statcalc.  OpenEpi: open source epidemiologic statistics for public
health 2.2th edition. 2008.
10. Clark CC: In harm's way: AMA physicians and the duty to
treat.  J Med Philo 2005, 30(1):65-87.
11. Huber SJ, Wynia MK: When pestilence prevails...physician
responsibilities in epidemics.  Am J Bioeth 2004, 4(1):W5-11.
12. Qureshi K, Gershon RR, Sherman MF, Straub T, Gebbie E, McCollum
M, Erwin MJ, Morse SS, Gershon RRM: Health care workers' abil-
ity and willingness to report to duty during catastrophic dis-
asters.  J Urban Health 2005, 82(3):378-388.
13. Ruderman C, Tracy CS, Bensimon CM, Bernstein M, Hawryluck L,
Shaul RZ, Upshur RE, et al.: On pandemics and the duty to care:
whose duty? who cares?  BMC Med Ethics 2006, 7:E5.
14. Straus SE, Wilson K, Rambaldini G, Rath D, Lin Y, Gold WL, Kapral
MK: Severe acute respiratory syndrome and its impact on
professionalism: qualitative study of physicians' behaviour
during an emerging healthcare crisis.  BMJ 2004, 329(7457):83.
15. Balicer RD, Omer SB, Barnett DJ, Everly GS Jr: Local public health
workers' perceptions toward responding to an influenza pan-
demic.  BMC Public Health 2006, 6:99.
16. Tam DK, Lee S: Impact of SARS on avian influenza prepared-
ness in healthcare workers.  Infection 2007, 35(5):320-325.
17. Stuart RL, Gillespie EE: Hospital pandemic preparedness: health
care workers' opinions on working during a pandemic.  MJA
2007, 187(11–12):676.
18. Irvin C, Cindrich L, Patterson W: Hospital personnel response
during a hypothetical influenza pandemic: will they come to
work?  Acad Emerg Med 2007, 14(S13):.
19. Ehrenstein BP, Hanses F, Salzberger B: Influenza pandemic and
professional duty: family or patients first? A survey of hospi-
tal employees.  BMC Public Health 2006, 6:311.
20. Zuger A, Miles SH: Physicians, AIDS, and occupational risk.
Historic traditions and ethical obligations.  JAMA 1987,
258(14):1924-1928.
21. Ha KG, Cohen DJ: From plague and tuberculosis to AIDS: a
reflection on the medical profession.  Tex Med 1991,
87(3):76-80.
22. Cohn JA, Warren JW: The HIV epidemic and the primary care
physician.  Md Med J 1991, 40(3):185-190.
23. Emanuel EJ: Do physicians have an obligation to treat patients
with AIDS?  N Engl J Med 1988, 318(25):1686-1690.
24. Link RN, Feingold AR, Charap MH, Freeman K, Shelov SP: Concerns
of medical and pediatric house officers about acquiring AIDS
from their patients.  Am J Public Health 1988, 78(4):455-459.
25. Shiao JS, Koh D, Lo LH, Lim MK, Guo YL: Factors predicting
nurses' consideration of leaving their job during the SARS
outbreak.  Nurs Ethics 2007, 14(1):5-17.
26. Reynolds DL, Garay JR, Deamond SL, Moran MK, Gold W, Styra R:
Understanding, compliance and psychological impact of the
SARS quarantine experience.  Epidemiol Infect 2008,
136(7):997-1007.
27. Wroe AL, Turner N, Salkovskis PM: Understanding and predict-
ing parental decisions about early childhood immunizations.
Health Psychol 2004, 23(1):33-41.
Pre-publication history
The pre-publication history for this paper can be accessed
here:
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/30/prepub